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UNIONIZING NCAA DIVISION I
ATHLETICS: A VIABLE SOLUTION?
ROHITH A. PARASURAMAN†
ABSTRACT
This Note considers whether college athletes—specifically Division
I football and men’s basketball players—can utilize the protections of
the National Labor Relations Act to form unions. The Note examines
the history of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, considers
whether National Labor Relations Board jurisprudence allows the
application of the NLRA to college athletics, and evaluates the
potential consequences of the NLRB certifying a union of college
athletes. The Note argues that the NLRB should not allow college
athletes to unionize, but should instead let Congress decide whether
college athletes are “employees” under the NLRA, and, if so, how
they should be regulated.

INTRODUCTION
Ramogi Huma, a former college football player at the University
of California, Los Angeles, founded the National College Players
Association (NCPA) after the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) suspended his teammate, Donnie Edwards,
from participation in college football.1 The NCAA, which requires
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1. The NCPA, About the President, http://www.ncpanow.org/about_the_chairman.asp
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007). The NCAA, in its own words, is “a bottom-up organization”
comprised of member “colleges, universities and conferences . . . [that] establish programs to
govern, promote and further the purposes and goals of intercollegiate athletics.” NCAA,
Overview, http://www.ncaa.org/ (follow “About the NCAA, Overview”) (last visited Nov. 27,
2007).
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2
college athletes to be “amateurs,” punished Edwards for accepting
free groceries once he had exhausted his scholarship money.3 The
NCPA hopes to change what it views as unreasonable NCAA policies
that lead to sanctions against athletes such as Edwards. Its goals
include an increase in the scholarship amount universities provide to
college athletes, the provision of health coverage by universities for
all sports-related workouts (including “off-season” workouts, which
universities do not have to insure), the elimination of restrictions on
the pursuit of employment by college athletes, and the elimination or
easing of restrictions on the ability of college athletes to transfer
between schools.4
The NCPA has yet to achieve many of its objectives, but perhaps
it or another group of college athletes could strengthen efforts to
5
bring about change by forming a labor union. Achieving the status of
a “labor organization” under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) would provide a group of college athletes with numerous
rights enjoyed by unions in other industries, including the rights to
6
7
bargain collectively and to strike. But could a group such as the
NCPA be a “labor organization” under the NLRA? Only
“employees” can form a valid “labor organization” under the NLRA.8
The NCPA could therefore only form a labor organization if college
athletes were “employees” and the NCAA or its member institutions
were “employers.”9
The NLRA itself provides no extensive definition of
“employee,” other than the mere indication that an employee is

2. 2006–07 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 14.01.3.1 (2006), available at http://
www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division_i_manual/2006-07/2006-07_d1_manual.pdf.
3. Steve Springer, Edwards Suspended for One Game; UCLA: Linebacker Ordered to Pay
Restitution for $150 Worth of Groceries Left at His Apartment, Allegedly by Agent, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 1995, at C4.
4. The NCPA, Mission & Goals, http://www.ncpanow.org/our_mission.asp (last visited
Nov. 27, 2007).
5. The NCPA has enlisted the assistance of the United Steelworkers Union, The United
Steelworkers Union supports the NCPA, http://www.cacnow.org/the_united_steelworkers_
support_the_ncpa.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2007), but has not applied for recognition as a “labor
organization,” or union, under the National Labor Relations Act. See National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2000) (providing the National Labor Relations Board with the
authority to determine the appropriate unity for collective bargaining).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
7. Id. § 163.
8. Id. § 152(5).
9. Id. § 152(3).
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10
something distinct from an “employer.” The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) has therefore had to elucidate the
term “employee” under the NLRA. As part of its efforts, the Board
has incorporated the common-law “right of control” test into the
definition of “employee.”11 Because it serves to distinguish an
“employee” from an “independent contractor,” satisfaction of the
12
“right of control” test is necessary to establish “employee” status.
Satisfying the test, however, is not sufficient. In addition to the
common-law requirements, the NLRB must certify every potential
union proposed under the NLRA, and thus each member of a valid
“labor organization” must be an “employee” under NLRA
jurisprudence, in addition to satisfying the “right of control” test.13
NLRA jurisprudence does not address whether college athletes
can be “employees.” By not speaking directly on the issue, Congress
empowered the NLRB to apply the NLRA to college athletes in one
or more sports, so long as that application is “determined broadly . . .
by underlying economic facts.”14 Were the NLRB to classify some set
of college athletes as “employees” under the NLRA, the implications
would be drastic, including the possible elimination of many
nonrevenue college sports.15 Given the potential consequences of
NLRB action, and the cultural significance of college athletics, the
NLRB should refrain from upsetting the structure of college athletics

10. The NLRA definition of “employee” is circular. See id. (“The term ‘employee’ shall
include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer . . . .”).
11. See Carnation Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1882, 1887 (1968) (“[T]he decisions of the Board have
placed emphasis on the right of control, with a distinction being drawn between control over the
manner and means by which a result is to be accomplished and control limited to the result
sought.”).
12. See id. (“Control over the manner and means is indicative of an employee relationship;
control restricted to the object or result sought is indicative of independent contractor
relationship.”).
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (outlining how the NLRB shall determine the appropriate
bargaining unit); Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 491–92 (2004) (reaffirming the NLRB’s right
to exclude students from a bargaining unit in which nonstudents are represented).
14. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944).
15. For the purposes of this Note, revenue sports are those that generate large revenues,
specifically Division I men’s football and basketball. See NCAA, 2002–03 NCAA REVENUES
AND EXPENSES OF DIVISIONS I AND II INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 13–
15 (2005) [hereinafter NCAA REVENUE REPORT] (providing data on revenues generated by
sports); Tom Farrey, NCAA Might Face Damages in Hundreds of Millions, ESPN, Feb. 21, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2337810 (“The class-action claim was brought on
behalf of Division I-A football players and major-college basketball players, whose programs
generate the overwhelming amount of revenue that flows into college athletic departments.”).
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and instead await guidance from Congress on unionization by college
athletes.
This Note discusses the issue of unionizing college athletics from
several angles. In Part I, it details the relevant history and structure of
the NCAA, with particular attention to the NCAA’s relationships
with its member institutions and with college athletes. In Part II, it
explores the application of federal labor law to college athletics,
including whether college athletes are “employees” under labor law
and what the appropriate bargaining units might be for college
athletes. Finally, in Part III, it discusses the consequences of
unionizing college athletes, including potential gains for college
athletes and the altered nature of college athletics.
I. THE NCAA: HISTORY AND
RELATIONSHIPS WITH INSTITUTIONS AND ATHLETES
NLRB action certifying a group of athletes as a union would
force drastic changes in the complex dynamic between athletes,
universities, and the NCAA. As the governing organization for
college athletics, the NCAA plays an important role in the
relationship between athletes and universities: its rules provide the
framework under which college athletes participate in their respective
sports.16 To understand the policy implications of unionizing college
athletics, one must understand the history and structure of the
NCAA.
A. Beginnings
Football led to the creation of the NCAA. Late in the nineteenth
century and early in the twentieth, three problems plagued football:
17
brutality, recruiting, and subsidization. Despite numerous reform

16. NCAA regulations are widespread in college sports, controlling everything from onfield rules, see, e.g., NCAA, 2007 FOOTBALL RULES AND INTERPRETATIONS (2007), to athlete
eligibility for participation in sports, see 2006–07 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 2, art.
14 (“Eligibility: Academic and General Requirements”). Because of the pervasiveness of
NCAA regulation, NCAA policy decisions have significant consequences for college athletes.
17. JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA, THE NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY 37 (2006). Two
examples illustrate the prevalence of recruiting and payment to players at the time. First,
Fielding Yost, a star football player at West Virginia University, transferred to Lafayette
midseason in 1896 under the guise of an interest in engineering, played one game for Lafayette
(a victory over rival University of Pennsylvania), and then, “the attraction of engineering
apparently having diminished,” returned to West Virginia. Id. Second, James Hogan, at the age
of twenty-seven, played football for Yale:
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movements and calls for change, especially from university faculty,
misgivings about the lack of amateurism and violence associated with
football were not enough to bring about substantial changes, and the
sport, growing in popularity all the while, remained largely
18
undisturbed. Real change came about when, in a 1905 meeting with
the presidents of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, President Theodore
19
Roosevelt threatened to abolish football if it was not reformed. This
threat provided sufficient impetus, eventually, for college presidents
to organize into an association that later became the NCAA.20
Originally, the NCAA operated under a system known as “home
rule.” NCAA bylaws established amateurism principles, but the
member institutions themselves were the enforcers of the principles.21
The choice to use a home rule system “carried with it a built-in
tension between the [NCAA]’s commitment to amateurism and its
reliance on the member institutions to honor that goal.”22 In essence,
the fox was guarding the hen house.
Eventually, as NCAA membership grew and radio and television
coverage became more widespread, there were increasing reports of
23
varying degrees of compliance with amateurism principles. In
response, the NCAA in 1948 adopted a “Sanity Code” consisting of
five principles “covering financial aid, recruitment, academic
standards for athletes, institutional control and the principle of
amateurism itself,” and enforcement procedures that included
expulsion of a university from the NCAA with a two-thirds majority

The institution paid his tuition and gave him a luxurious suite of rooms, free meals at
the University Club, a $100 scholarship and (shared with two others) all profits from
game day program sales. He also was made the New Haven agent for the American
Tobacco Company, receiving a commission for every packet of cigarettes sold in that
city. And, during the fall semester, but after the football season, he was awarded a 10day vacation in Cuba.
Id.
18. See id. at 37, 40 (detailing the efforts by faculty members at some schools to curb the
barbarism associated with football and the ensuing backlash against the protesters, particularly
at the University of Michigan, where influential alumni disbanded the faculty reform group and
replaced it with a group much friendlier to the sport).
19. Id. at 44.
20. Id. at 10. Change was not immediate. At first, there were competing factions of football
rulemaking bodies, and the “Big Three” (Harvard, Yale, and Princeton) were in fact reluctant
to make major changes. Only after President Roosevelt used his influence once again was there
a unified effort to make change. Id.
21. Id. at 55.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 68–69.
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24
vote of its membership. Though response from campuses across the
country was initially positive, when the NCAA found that seven
institutions had committed violations, it was unable to obtain the two25
thirds majority vote required for expulsion. The sense of lawlessness
became more pervasive after the Court of General Sessions in New
York found a number of basketball players guilty of point shaving in
26
New York City. The probe into the incident led Judge Saul Streit to
conclude that college football and basketball were “no longer
amateur sports.”27
It took another serious scandal to push the NCAA into a strong
enforcement role. Among the guilty in the point-shaving cases were
five University of Kentucky basketball players, and Judge Streit had
stated that the University of Kentucky’s basketball teams of the late
1940s and early 1950s were “commercialized enterprises.”28 In
addition, the Commonwealth of Kentucky hired a consulting firm that
reported that the athletic program at the university “ha[d] become
professionalized” and recommended that the university return to “an
29
The commonwealth ignored these
amateur sports basis.”
recommendations, but the NCAA, after finding that ten University of
Kentucky players had received illegal financial aid, successfully
imposed a one-year “death penalty” on the Kentucky basketball
team, prohibiting other NCAA institutions from competing with
Kentucky for one year.30 The Kentucky case ushered in a new era of
the NCAA, one in which the NCAA became a credible enforcer of its
31
rules and took control of many aspects of college sports.

B. The NCAA, Its Member Institutions, and College Athletes
Since initially embracing its role as college sports’ rule enforcer,
the NCAA has undergone numerous changes in its membership and

24. Id. at 69.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 70.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 83 (quoting Judge Streit).
29. Id. (quotations omitted).
30. Id.
31. The NCAA began exercising a great deal of control over all aspects of athletics,
including the negotiation of television contracts in football for all of its members. The Supreme
Court, however, struck down that particular NCAA practice as an illegal horizontal restraint of
trade. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984) (holding the NCAA’s college
football television regulations in violation of the Sherman Act).
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structure, ultimately segregating its membership into three divisions:
32
Division I, Division, II, and Division III. The differences between
the divisions are largely economic. This Note focuses on Division I,
whose membership rules require that institutions provide financial
grants to athletes.33 The NCAA requires Division I member
institutions to follow the rules contained in the NCAA Division I
34
Manual. Aside from general provisions, which consist mainly of
broad statements supporting amateurism and other goals of the
NCAA, the member institutions themselves control specific
35
intradivision rules. In this sense, the NCAA is a private, voluntary,
member-controlled association.36
The relationships between college athletes and the NCAA result
from delegation of certain aspects of athlete participation in sports
from universities to the NCAA by way of university membership in
the NCAA. At the Division I level, particularly in revenue sports,
universities recruit athletes to enroll in classes and participate in
athletics. Without the NCAA, the relationship between a university
and its athletes would be wholly the business of the university and the
athlete. Theoretically, in this scenario, universities could give athletes
numerous inducements, including salaries, and may not even require

32. Division I is further subdivided in football into the Bowl Subdivision and the Football
Championship Division, formerly known as I–A and I–AA, respectively. NCAA, What’s the
Difference Between Divisions I, II, and III?, http://www.ncaa.org/about/div_criteria.html (last
visited Nov. 27, 2007).
33. 2006–07 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 2, art. 20.9. Additional requirements
include that qualifying institutions have more sports and more of a public following, including
minimum attendance requirements for football, than institutions in the other divisions. Id. The
contrast between Division I and Divisions II and III is apparent from the NCAA’s own
description of the divisions. Whereas Division I institutions must provide “financial aid awards”
for their athletics programs, id. art. 20.9.1, the NCAA does not require Division II institutions to
do so, and Division III institutions cannot provide financial aid to athletes. NCAA, supra note
32. The NCAA points out that, in Division III, “the student athlete’s experience is of paramount
concern.” 2006–07 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 2, art. 20.9. The distinction allows
the inference that in Division I the “paramount concern” is with something other than “the
student athlete’s experience,” and the fact that a Division I requirement is a minimum level of
spectator attendance suggests that economic considerations are critical for Division I
membership.
34. 2006–07 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 2, art. 1.3.2.
35. Id. art. 4 (providing for election of governing boards by member institutions).
36. Professional sports leagues such as the National Football League are analogous in
structure, although the members of the professional leagues are for-profit enterprises and
NCAA member institutions are nonprofit organizations.
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37
athletes to enroll in classes. Indeed, with no NCAA regulation,
“amateurism” could exist at one university and not at another, or
college sports could be de facto professional.38 By becoming members
of the NCAA, however, universities agree to subject themselves to
NCAA rules, which member institutions collectively formulate,
including rules regarding relationships between universities and
39
athletes. Thus, athletes become indirectly bound to the NCAA.
Although a solitary university or group of universities could
conceivably disassociate itself from the NCAA, most universities
would likely refuse to break NCAA rules to participate in athletics
with “separatist” universities, because to do so they would have to
largely forgo interuniversity athletic competition with the remaining
NCAA schools.40 As a result, athletes must abide by NCAA rules if
they want to compete.41

37. Such was essentially the state of affairs before the NCAA successfully took on a strong
enforcement role. See supra Part I.A.
38. Scrutiny of major college athletics by the media probably constrains some “renegade”
behavior by universities. Absent NCAA regulation, media scrutiny could possibly prevent
widespread disregard of the principles of amateurism. More likely, however, the “renegade”
university would at some point cease to be a “renegade,” and, to compete with each other,
universities would have to continuously mimic and one-up each other, moving farther away
from an amateur model and closer to a professional, competitive market model. Indeed, some
argue that, even with the presence of NCAA regulation, many college sports are professional or
at least quasi-professional. See, e.g., Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete:
Undermining Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24
HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 41 (2000) (“A person employed to play sports cannot truly be called an
amateur.”).
39. See 2006–07 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 2, art 1.3.2.
40. Presumably, the NCAA would impose a “death penalty” on a “separatist” university.
For an example of this type of penalty, see the NCAA’s treatment of the University of
Kentucky basketball program, supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
41. In basketball and football, the rules of professional leagues confine athletes to college.
National Football League rules require players to be three years out of high school to be eligible
for the draft. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NFL Management Council and the
NFL Players Association, Article XVI, Section 2(b) (Mar. 8, 2006). National Basketball
Association rules require that players be at least nineteen years of age to be eligible for the
draft. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National Basketball Association and the
NBA Players Association, Article X, Section 1(b)(i) (July 29, 2005). Thus, in most cases,
athletes in these sports must play college sports, an arrangement that allows universities to
attain top talent.
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II. FEDERAL LABOR LAW AND COLLEGE ATHLETES
Federal labor law is applicable to employer-employee
relationships that affect interstate commerce.42 Previous decisions of
both the NLRB and the United States Supreme Court have found
that a university is an “employer” under the NLRA in certain
43
situations. No decision, however, has spoken to whether the
relationship between universities and college athletes amounts to one
of an employer and employee under the NLRA. If, under the NLRA,
college athletes are “employees” and universities are “employers,”
then other provisions of the NLRA apply to the relationship, and
college athletes have numerous rights, including the right to
unionize.44
The question of whether college athletes are “employees” under
the NLRA is complex, and the NLRB should not be the body to
impose unionized labor on college sports. This Part will first discuss
NLRB jurisprudence in the graduate assistant context, the most
closely analogous field in which the NLRB has refereed. It will next
explore the murky issue of whether the NLRA applies to the
relationship between universities and college athletes.
A. Employer-Employee Relationship: The Graduate Assistant
Precedent
For athletes to have the right to unionize under the NLRA,
universities must be employers, and athletes must be employees. It is
45
settled that universities can be employers under federal labor law.
Thus, the important consideration in the athletics context is whether

42. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2000).
43. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980) (disapproving of faculty
union not because university was not an employer, but because faculty had managerial jobs);
Long Island Univ., C.W. Post Ctr., 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 904 (1971) (referring to the university as
an “Employer”).
44. Athletes could also strike and engage in similarly protected collective actions. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157–59.
45. The Supreme Court in one instance held that faculty members of universities are
managerial employees, and thus cannot form a unit appropriate for collective bargaining.
Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 672. In somewhat different factual situations, however, courts have
suggested that faculty are in fact not managerial employees and thus can form a collective
bargaining unit. See, e.g., Stephens Inst. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1980) (distinguishing
faculty with no policy role at start-up art school from faculty in Yeshiva). In either scenario, the
fact that universities are not by definition exempt from employer status under labor law is taken
as a given.
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athletes can be “employees.” Neither the NLRB nor the federal
courts have spoken directly on this matter, but the NLRB has found
that graduate teaching assistants are “employees” in certain contexts.
Although not directly applicable, NLRB jurisprudence with respect
to graduate teaching assistants provides some insight into how the
Board may treat college athletes.
The NLRB has struggled to delineate policy in the graduate
assistant area and has changed its treatment of graduate assistants as
“employees” several times. When first faced with the question in
Adelphi University,46 the Board held that graduate teaching assistants
are “primarily students who do not share a sufficient community of
interest with the regular faculty” to be included in a collective
bargaining unit with faculty.47 In Leland Stanford Junior University,48
the NLRB faced the question of whether research assistants could,
instead of interspersing themselves in a bargaining unit consisting of
regular university faculty, form a separate employee collective
bargaining unit.49 The Board further foreclosed from graduate
assistants the rights afforded “employees” under the NLRA,
concluding that graduate research assistants “are not employees
within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the [NLRA]” and thus not
entitled to the protections of the NLRA afforded to employees,
including the right to form a union.50
In 1999, while considering the situation of medical interns and
residents, the NLRB modified its position on the “employee” status
of individuals whose pursuits were ostensibly academic in nature. In
51
Boston Medical Center, the Board ultimately found that medical
residents are employees under the NLRA despite recognizing that a
central purpose of medical residency programs is to train doctors.52
Pointing to Supreme Court precedent, the NLRB emphasized that
[t]he “breadth of § 2(3)’s definition is striking. The Act specifically
applies to ‘any employee.’” The exclusions listed in the statute are

46. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
47. Id. at 640.
48. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
49. Id. at 621.
50. Id. at 623.
51. Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
52. See id. at 159 (“[We] conclude that house staff are employees as defined by the Act,
and find that such individuals are therefore entitled to all the statutory rights and obligations
that flow from our conclusion.”).
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limited and narrow, and do not, on their face, encompass the
category “students.” Thus, unless there are other statutory or policy
reasons for excluding house staff, they literally and plainly come
within the meaning of “employee” as defined in the Act. We find no
53
such reasons.

In this manner, the NLRB broadened the extent to which it gave
“employee” status to individuals whose fundamental relationship
with a university is arguably educational.
In 2000, the NLRB applied the rationale behind Boston Medical
Center to the graduate teaching assistant context previously addressed
54
in Leland Stanford Junior University. In New York University, the
NLRB decided that graduate student assistants were employees, and,
unlike the graduate assistants in Leland Stanford Junior University,
they could form a union and enjoy the other privileges and
55
protections of the NLRA. This time, the Board started with the
premise, established by Boston Medical Center, that “unless a
category of workers is among the few groups specifically exempted
from the [NLRA]’s coverage,” or there is no relationship between the
workers and the purported employer reflecting common-law agency,
the workers, by default are “employees” under the NLRA.56 Despite
differences in working conditions, compensation structure, and
academic standing, the NLRB refused to distinguish the New York
University situation from the situation in Boston Medical Center.57
Instead, the Board held that the controlling similarity was that in both
cases the workers in question “perform[ed] work for their employer,
under their employer’s control”—not the relative amounts of time
58
spent working for employers. The NLRB also refused to embrace

53. Id. at 160 (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891–92 (1984)) (citation
omitted).
54. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
55. Id. at 1205.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1206. Specifically, New York University argued that
(1) the Regional Director ignored evidence that the house staff spent 80 percent of
their time providing services (patient care) for the hospital, while graduate assistants
spend only 15 percent of their time performing graduate assistants’ duties for the
Employer; (2) graduate assistants do not receive compensation for their teaching and
other duties as did the Boston Medical Center house staff; and (3) graduate assistants
perform this work in ‘furtherance’ of their degree, while the house staff already had
their degrees.
Id.
58.

Id.
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policy considerations favoring that graduate assistants were not
“employees.” Specifically, the Board rejected the notion that allowing
graduate assistants to invoke the protections afforded “employees”
by the NLRA would infringe on university “academic freedom,”
explaining that, “[a]fter nearly 30 years of experience with bargaining
units of faculty members,” academic freedom could be handled
59
effectively as “any other issue in collective bargaining.” The Board
concluded that “[it could not] say as a matter of law or policy that
permitting graduate assistants to be considered employees entitled to
the benefits of the Act [would] result in improper interference with
the academic freedom of the institution they serve.”60
The result in New York University lasted all of four years. When
faced with the issue in 2004, the Board once again reversed itself and
reverted to pre-New York University jurisprudence. In a 3-2 decision
61
in Brown University, the NLRB decided that “graduate student
assistants are not statutory employees.”62 The graduate assistants in
Brown University were essentially the same as the graduate assistants
in New York University. Deviating from its New York University
holding, the NLRB majority held in Brown University that the money
received by students is not “consideration for work” but simply
“financial aid.”63 This finding was part of an overall effort by the
Board to move away from the New York University holding and rely
instead on previous holdings, such as Leland Stanford Junior
University.64 After concluding that “the overall relationship between
the graduate student assistants and Brown is primarily an educational
one, rather than an economic one,”65 the Board emphasized that, if
graduate assistants were considered employees, then “‘[NLRB]
involvement in matters of strictly academic concern is only a petition
or an unfair labor practice charge away.’”66 The NLRB specifically
noted:

59. Id. at 1208.
60. Id. at 1209.
61. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
62. Id. at 483.
63. Id. at 488.
64. Id. at 489.
65. Id. at 487 (noting that the “Board’s 25-year pre-NYU principle of regarding graduate
students as nonemployees was sound and well reasoned”).
66. Id. at 490 (quoting St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1003 (1977).
Thus, the NLRB majority moved away from its explicit refusal in New York University to deny
“employee” status to graduate assistants on policy grounds. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205,
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(1) the petitioned-for individuals are students; (2) working as a TA,
RA, or proctor, and receipt of a stipend and tuition remission,
depends on continued enrollment as a student; (3) the principal time
commitment at Brown is focused on obtaining a degree, and, thus,
being a student; and (4) serving as a TA, RA, or proctor, is part and
parcel of the core elements of the Ph. D. degree, which are teaching
and research. Although the structure of universities, like other
institutions, may have changed, these facts illustrate that the basic
relationship between graduate students and their university has
67
not.

Thus, since 2004, the Board has maintained that, unlike medical
interns and residents, graduate teaching assistants are not employees
under the NLRA.
B. Are College Athletes “Employees” under the NLRA?
But what do NLRB decisions in the graduate assistant context
mean for college athletes and the potential for them to form unions?
At least one analysis argues that, under Brown University, college
athletes in revenue-generating sports are entitled to “employee”
status under the NLRA but the NCAA and its member institutions
have deliberately and successfully evaded such classification for
decades.68 To assess this analysis and, more generally, the status of

1208–09 (2000). The dissent in Brown University pointed to situations in which graduate
assistant unions and academic institutions had reached collective bargaining agreements without
infringing on “academic freedom.” See Brown, 342 N.L.R.B. at 499 (“How can it be said that the
terms and conditions of graduate-student employment are not adaptable to collective
bargaining when collective bargaining over these precise issues is being conducted successfully
in universities across the nation? . . . The NYU agreement neatly illustrates the correctness of
the NYU [NLRB’s] view that the institution of collective bargaining is flexible enough to
succeed in this context, as it has in so many others, from manufacturing to entertainment, health
care to professional sports.”). The Brown University majority responded that
inasmuch as graduate student assistants are not statutory employees that is the end of
the inquiry. Nevertheless, . . . [e]ven if some unions have chosen not to intrude into
academic prerogatives, that does not mean that other unions would be similarly
abstemious. The certification sought by the Petitioner here has no limitations. . . .
[T]he broad power to bargain . . . would, in the case of graduate student assistants,
carry with it the power to intrude into areas that are at the heart of the educational
process.
Id. at 492.
67. Brown, 342 N.L.R.B. at 492.
68. See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the StudentAthlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 86 (2006) (“The NCAA
purposely created the term ‘student-athlete’ as propaganda, solely to obscure the reality of the
university-athlete employment relationship and to avoid universities’ legal responsibilities as
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college athletes under the law, it is necessary to analogize between
the posture of college athletes and that of graduate assistants, the
most similarly situated group for which NLRA jurisprudence exists.
After understanding the daily lives of men’s college football and
basketball players, it is questionable whether the NLRB would adopt
Brown University in the college athletic context, and, assuming that
the NLRB were to adopt Brown University for the college athletic
context, it is uncertain whether the NLRB would classify college
athletes as employees.
1. The Daily Lives of Division I Football and Men’s Basketball
Athletes. To assess whether the graduate assistant cases are relevant
in the college athlete context, a general understanding of the
demands on Division I college football or men’s basketball players is
necessary. Relying on interviews conducted with four different male
athletes who participated in either Division I college football or
basketball, Robert A. McCormick and Amy Christian McCormick
detail the daily lives of these athletes, both in and out of season.69 The
football season can last anywhere from fourteen to nineteen weeks,
and during the season, players devote on average roughly fifty-three
hours per week to football.70 The time includes practice, training, and
the travel and sequestration time that coaches impose on the days
71
surrounding actual games. In addition, coaches require players to
spend minimum amounts of time in study hall, and in some cases,
they even compel players to enroll in certain courses or sit in certain
seats in class.72 After the season, coaches still exert a great degree of
control over the players’ lives, requiring “vigorous” workouts, weight
lifting, and spring practice, which itself entails “an even more
demanding set of workouts.”73 During the academic year, outside of
the season, “players’ lives are essentially regulated from 5:30 a.m. to

employers [and] [i]n the ensuing fifty years, the NCAA, colleges, and universities have profited
immensely from the vigorous defense and preservation of this myth.”).
69. Id. at 97.
70. Id. at 98–99.
71. Id. at 100–01.
72. Id. at 100 (“[A]lthough the primary job of the players is to win football games, even
studying has become part of their jobs as universities and the NCAA seek to deflect criticism
over low graduation rates.”).
73. Id. at 101–02.
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74
10:00 p.m. four days per week.” Once the academic year is complete,
players still do not have complete freedom. In many cases, coaches
require players to remain on campus from Monday through Friday,
75
unless players receive permission from a coach to leave. Players are
also “strongly encouraged” to attend daily weight lifting and running
sessions.76 Sometimes there are restrictions on the private lives of
77
athletes as well, such as the prohibition of tobacco or alcohol use.
Division I men’s basketball players face similar restrictions.
During the season, basketball players “are required to spend four to
78
five hours per day, six days a week, wholly devoted to basketball.”
The typical day, which includes “running, weight training, . . .
cardiovascular conditioning, . . . practices and watch[ing] film of past
games or future opponents’ games,” was termed by one player as
“pure misery.”79 In addition, because basketball games take place
during the week and on weekends (unlike football games, which take
place primarily on Saturdays), basketball players must miss class time
to travel to and from games away from campus.80 Outside of the
season, basketball players “are required to stay in shape and in
81
contact with the coaching staff.” In most cases, this requires
minimum workouts of “three hours per day, seven days a week.”82

74. Id. at 102. Note that participation in workouts, training, practice, and study hall is
anything but voluntary, according to Professors McCormick and McCormick. Players are faced
with sanctions such as “additional running, weightlifting, or other exercises, . . . demotion to a
lower string . . . [or] outright dismissal from the team and withdrawal of the grant-in-aid . . . .”
Id. at 100. Thus, for football players, the very ability to attend the university is contingent upon
satisfying whatever rules are prescribed by coaches, as long as those rules are not so stringent as
to violate NCAA rules.
75. Id. at 102.
76. Id. (noting that players may not take summer classes “during the second summer
session because those classes conflict with official practices, which begin in the first week of
August”).
77. Id. at 105.
78. Id. at 106.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 107 (quoting one player stating that it is “impossible not to miss class,” and noting
that another “estimated that he is typically absent from fifteen to twenty percent of his classes”).
81. Id. at 108.
82. Id. For Professors McCormick and McCormick, the experiences of college football and
basketball players show that they are common-law employees. Id. (“[I]f any group of persons
may be called ‘employees’ based upon the degree of control exercised by a university, it must be
the employee-athletes enrolled there.”); id. at 108–09 (“The common law definition of
employee requires that the employer compensate the alleged employee for services rendered,
and the athletic grant-in-aid fulfills this role. The athletic grant-in-aid is unquestionably a
transfer of economic value to the employee-athlete in return for his athletic services.”). In
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2. Would the NLRB Adopt Brown University in the College
Athlete Context? Brown University is the NLRB holding most closely
related to the college athletics context. Nevertheless, it is unclear
whether the NLRB would be willing to apply that decision’s
analytical framework in the college athlete context. Because the
NLRB has been unable to formulate and maintain a policy with
respect to whether graduate assistants are “employees,” it likely
would also have much difficulty formulating a policy for college
athletes. Although the NLRB might use Brown University for
guidance, it might also distinguish Brown University by seizing on
certain differences between college athletes and graduate research
assistants.83
Two differences between college athletes and graduate teaching
assistants stand out. First, unlike the graduate students in Brown
University and the medical interns and residents in the Boston
Medical Center line of cases, college athletes are generally
undergraduate students. In distinguishing Boston Medical Center
from Brown University, the NLRB noted that the individuals in
question in Boston Medical Center “were interns, residents, and
fellows who had already completed and received their academic
degrees. . . . In [Brown University], the graduate assistants [were]
addition, McCormick and McCormick present analysis under the NLRB’s Brown University
holding with respect to whether college athletes (common-law employees in their minds) are
also “employees” under the NLRA. Id. at 120. They argue that, unlike the relationship at issue
in Brown University, the relationship between colleges and athletes in Division I football and
men’s basketball is an economic rather than an educational one. See id. at 130 (“The
relationship between employee-athletes and their universities . . . is nearly exclusively economic,
or commercial, and is decidedly not predominantly academic.”). According to McCormick and
McCormick, this reality is symbolized by the fact that graduate students are supervised by
faculty whereas athletes are supervised by coaches. See id. at 125–26 (“Faculty have no
supervisory role whatsoever over the athletic services athletes provide. . . . The fact that
coaches, not faculty members, supervise athletes’ services demonstrates that players’ work as
athletes is not educational in nature.”). To demonstrate that the relationship between college
athletes and their universities is primarily economic and not academic, McCormick and
McCormick provide an extensive discussion of the commercial nature of college athletics.
Particularly, they discuss: the large revenues generated from television and attendance at games,
academic standards that allow athletes who are not legitimate students to matriculate, freshmen
eligibility as an indication of disinterest in athletes’ academic success, demands on player time
that make it impossible for them to function effectively as students, curricula for athletes that
are worthless academically, higher frequency of academic probation by revenue sport athletes,
the presence of academic fraud to maintain athlete eligibility, NCAA requirements that allow
athletes to fall short of attaining a degree, and low graduation rates. Id. at 130–55.
83. Indeed, the Supreme Court has mandated that the NLRB not mechanically follow
legalistic rules when determining employee status. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111,
129 (1944).
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seeking their academic degrees and, thus, [were] clearly students.”
The vast majority of college athletes, in contrast to both the
individuals in Brown University and Boston Medical Center, are
undergraduate students who have completed less education than the
graduate assistants in Brown University.85
Second, the NLRB has reversed field and now frowns upon
granting “employee” status to graduate assistants. In doing so, it has
indicated that it is loathe to interfere with the affairs of colleges and
students. The NLRB has stated: “the first prerequisite to becoming a
graduate student assistant is being a student. Being a student, of
course, is synonymous with learning, education, and academic
86
pursuits.” Similarly, NCAA rules require college athletes to be
students before they can participate in athletics, which, according to
the NLRB, would bring them at least peripherally into the realm of
“academic pursuits.” Once a matter is within this realm, Brown
University indicates the NLRB’s strong reluctance to impose on the
affairs of a university. In Brown, the NLRB cited with approval the
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,87 which
noted that “[a]cademic freedom includes the right of a university ‘to
determine for itself . . . who may be admitted to study.’”88 The NLRB
couched much of its analysis in terms of the historical roots of the
89
NLRA. Should the NLRB determine that academic institutions best
resolve the issues arising from the relationship between athletes and
universities, rather than turning to national labor law for a resolution,
it may choose to develop no framework at all for the analysis of
“employment” in the college athletic context.
84. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004).
85. With respect to time commitment, college athletes fall somewhere between medical
interns and graduate assistants. Based on the interviews conducted by Professors McCormick
and McCormick, college football and basketball players spend approximately fifty-three and
thirty hours per week, respectively, on their athletic activities. McCormick & McCormick, supra
note 68, at 98–99, 100. By contrast, medical interns work between sixty and one hundred hours
per week, Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 184 (1999), and graduate research assistants
work about twenty hours per week, N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1213 (2000). The
combination of the differing time commitments and the fact that college athletes are
undergraduate students may carry enough weight to dissuade the NLRB from concluding that
college athletes are “employees.”
86. Brown, 342 N.L.R.B. at 488.
87. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
88. Brown, 342 N.L.R.B. at 490 n.26.
89. See id. at 487 (“[P]rinciples developed for use in the industrial setting cannot be
‘imposed blindly on the academic world.’” (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680–
81 (1980))).
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3. NLRB Analysis of College Athletes under Brown. Although
the NLRB could distinguish its holding in Brown University from the
context of college athletics, the language of the decision is broad
90
enough to apply to college athletes. Even if it adopted this broad
interpretation, an NLRB friendly to the notion of “academic
freedom” may nevertheless give wide latitude to universities in
determining what constitutes an educational program and how
students are admitted to those programs.
For example, what if the NLRB were to consider sport—like
science, business, the arts, or other traditionally academic
disciplines—a primary educational pursuit? If the NLRB were to
view participation in sports as part of the academic experience, the
NLRB might then find that an athlete is a student rather than an
“employee.” This notion seems less fanciful if one crudely distills the
purpose of a college education to the advancement into some
vocation at a professional level. In that context, the pursuit of athletic
skill to enable competition in professional sport is only superficially
different than the pursuit of medicine or law as a profession. If this is
the case, then despite the fact that athletes spend most of their time
being athletes, as opposed to being students, they would still be
“students” of the games they play, and the time spent on athletics
would essentially be time spent learning.91
Perhaps such reasoning would require a minor leap of faith, but
the NLRB may be willing to make such a leap. After all, the NLRB
denied “employee” status to graduate assistants in Brown University
partly because “collective bargaining would unduly infringe upon
traditional academic freedoms . . . involving traditional academic
92
decisions, including course length and content . . . .” Thus, if an
institution determines that football, with all of its strategies and

90. See id. (“It is clear to us that graduate student assistants, including those at Brown, are
primarily students and have a primarily educational, not economic, relationship with their
university.”). In contrast to graduate assistants, college athletes, as demonstrated by Professors
McCormick and McCormick, have an economic relationship with their universities. See
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 68, at 130–55 (“Employee-Athletes Are Not Primarily
Students and Their Relationship with Their Universities Is an Economic One.”).
91. Contra McCormick & McCormick, supra note 68, at 120–30. Professors McCormick
and McCormick extract a four-factor framework from Brown University—status of graduate
assistants as students, role of graduate-student assistantships in education, the relationship
between graduate student assistants and faculty, and the financial support graduate student
assistants receive to attend school—and contrast its actual application in Brown University to
graduate students, who are nonemployees, with its hypothetical application to athletes. Id.
92. Brown, 342 N.L.R.B. at 490 (emphasis added).
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complexities, is an “academic” pursuit, the NLRB may treat football
as any other academic field rather than trammel on the “academic
freedom” of the institution to determine course content.
Equating athletic participation to academic participation would
significantly change the posture of college athletics. Athletic services
provided by athletes would become an essential part of the athlete’s
education. Under the NCAA’s existing framework, athletes do not
necessarily receive academic credit for their participation in sports; if
sports, however, became part of an athlete’s education, then
participation in sports activities could be considered “required
elements” of an athlete’s educational program.93 By similar reasoning,
the supervision of athletes by coaches rather than faculty would be
cast in a different light, as coaches would then be the primary
purveyors of knowledge in the athletes’ educational experiences.94
Although it is difficult to reconcile the big-money college sports
of Division I football and men’s basketball with traditional notions of
academic study and educational mission, it is not outside the realm of
possibility that the NLRB would take such a step. The NLRB has had
a difficult time elucidating labor policies in multiple areas, including
with respect to universities and graduate assistants. It would almost
certainly face difficulties when grappling with the issue of college
athletes as “employees.”
III. CONSEQUENCES OF COLLEGE
ATHLETES BEING “EMPLOYEES” UNDER THE NLRA
The remainder of this Note will analyze the possible
ramifications of an NLRB finding that college athletes participating
in Division I men’s football and basketball were “employees” under
the NLRA. Because of the complex issues involved in imposing labor
law on college athletics, if a change as drastic as unionizing college
athletes were to occur, it should come about by an act of Congress,
and not by the whim of a federal agency such as the NLRB.

93. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 68, at 122–25. Institutions may decide to grant
academic credit for sports-related activities, and some already have done something similar. See
Mark Schlabach, Varsity Athletes Get Class Credit; Some Colleges Give Grades for Playing,
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at A1 (“[N]early three dozen universities award academic credit for
participation on intercollegiate sports teams.”).
94. See generally McCormick & McCormick, supra note 68, at 125 (discussing how athletes
are primarily supervised by coaching staffs).
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A. The Appropriate Bargaining Unit
Ostensibly, employee status ought to be limited to Division I
football and men’s basketball, as at least two scholars have argued,
because these are the sports that generate large revenues.95 If the
NLRB did decide that a college athlete should be treated as an
employee, it would probably limit its holding to the facts before it.
For example, if the first successful claim for “employee” status came
from a football player, perhaps the NLRB would limit its holding to
football. If that were to occur, a men’s basketball player would
undoubtedly bring a challenge. But why stop there? What about
women’s basketball, which generates significant revenues, especially
at certain universities?96 Where should the line be drawn?
These questions reveal the difficulty of addressing the college
athlete as “employee” question in the first place. The only available
model for unionizing college sports is that of professional sports,
which has labor unions and collective bargaining agreements in each
sport between team owners and player unions. Universities present
an entirely different animal, one in which multiple sports are housed
under one administration. Thus, the “employer” is the same for the
men’s basketball team, the football team, the women’s basketball
team, and the women’s swim team. By contrast, in professional sports,
a league of owners in a single sport forms a multiemployer bargaining
97
unit to deal with a union of players of that sport. This arrangement
highlights certain economic differences between a university system
and professional sports. Any successful professional sports team or
league will be self-sustaining, with revenues generated by league
games, events, and television-licensing contracts sufficient to
compensate players and turn a profit. The collective bargaining
process simply determines how much of total revenues or profits

95. See id. at 74 n.9.
96. See Robert W. Brown & R. Todd Jewell, The Marginal Revenue Product of a Women’s
College Basketball Player, 45 INDUS. RELATIONS 96, 100 (2006) (“[A] premium women’s college
basketball player generates $241,337 annually for her school . . . .”).
97. See, e.g. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NFL Management Council and
the NFL Players Association, Preamble (Mar. 8, 2006) (“This Agreement . . . is made and
entered into . . . by and between the National Football League Management Council . . . , which
is recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future employer
member Clubs of the National Football League . . . , and the National Football League Players
Association.”).
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98
players will receive in the form of salary. In college sports, however,
most sports are not self-sustaining. Although college football and
men’s basketball may be profitable at some universities, many
99
universities operate at a loss for those and other sports. This
presents a number of difficult questions. What criteria should the
NLRB use to determine if a given university’s athletes in a given
sport can unionize? And what athletes should be grouped into a
bargaining unit? With respect to the “employer,” what is the
appropriate unit—the universities individually or the NCAA as a sort
of multiemployer bargaining unit?
There are several possible solutions, most of which would involve
some sort of initial line drawing among athletes to determine whether
they qualify for “employee” status. The most rudimentary solution on
the “employee” side would be a Board decision that college athletes
are eligible to be treated as “employees” under the NLRA, with no
further instruction. Athletes could then organize themselves however
they saw fit. Perhaps football players at one university would form a
union and begin a dialogue with their university. Alternatively, they
could form a union with other football players at universities in their
conference or throughout the country and attempt to effect change at
100
a broader level. The NLRB could stay above the fray until
presented with a specific issue, probably something along the lines of
certifying a given bargaining unit. In this manner, athletes who want
to form a union would unionize, and athletes who do not would not.
Despite the apparent simplicity of an NLRB holding that college
athletes qualify for “employee” status under the NLRA, at some
point the NLRB will almost certainly have to engage in more
complex line drawing. For example, suppose the Duke University
men’s basketball team forms a union and votes to go on strike if the
players do not receive an increase in their financial aid packages that

98. In many cases the division of revenues or profits is explicit. For example, the National
Football League collective agreement stipulates that at least 50 percent of revenues be used for
player salaries. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NFL Management Council and
the NFL Players Association, Article XXIV, Section 3 (Mar. 8, 2006).
99. See NCAA REVENUE REPORT, supra note 15, at 14 (“In Division I–A, [68] percent of
schools reported a profit . . . for their football programs and [70] percent reported profits from
men’s basketball . . . . The remaining Division I–A schools lost . . . [money] on these
programs.”).
100. One possibility would be an expansion of the National College Players Association. See
generally The NCPA, Mission & Goals, http://www.ncpanow.org/our_mission.asp (last visited
Nov. 27, 2007) (stating its mission “[t]o provide the means for college athletes to voice their
concerns and change NCAA rules”).
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101
compensates them for their full cost of attendance. If Duke
complies with the demands of the players, it will violate NCAA rules
and jeopardize NCAA membership.102 If it does not comply, then it
faces the possibility of a strike by its basketball players. Thus,
although the NLRB could decide to limit the employer-employee
relationship to the university-athlete context, the presence of the
NCAA bylaws and the significance of NCAA membership make the
NCAA a vital party to this dispute.103 The NLRB would therefore
have to decide whether to order the NCAA to form multiemployer
bargaining units, similar to those of professional sports leagues, and if
so, how to structure them.
One possibility is to allow units for different sports at different
levels: all Division I basketball universities could be part of a unit, for
example, and the NLRB could order the players at those universities
to form their own complementary unit. Alternatively, all athletes at
Division I universities could be part of a unit. This arrangement
would limit the number of different bargaining units, but would likely
cause representation problems in trying to sort out the different
104
interests of different athletes. In any case, there is bound to be a
misalignment of interests at some level, a reality that brings to light
the issue of the autonomy of universities over their athletic programs.

B. The Impact of Unionization on College Athletics
Most Division I athletic programs operate at a loss, despite the
strong economic success of their football or basketball programs. In
101. A class action antitrust lawsuit was filed jointly by Jason White and Brian Polak,
former college football players at Stanford University and the University of California, Los
Angeles, respectively, and Jovan Harris and Chris Craig, former college basketball players at
the University of San Francisco and the University of Texas at El Paso, respectively, in the
Federal District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division, making this very
demand. See Complaint for Violation of Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, White v.
NCAA, No. CV 06-8999 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2006) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The suit
asks for certification of a class consisting of all recipients of athletic-based grants-in-aid from
any “major” college football or basketball program, and seeks unspecified damages and
injunctive relief against the NCAA. Id.
102. See 2006–07 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 2, art. 3.2.1.2 (“The institution
shall administer its athletics programs in accordance with the constitution, bylaws and other
legislation of the Association.”).
103. See supra Part I.B.
104. Under this scenario, the NLRB would also have to draw some sort of line between
athletes who are “employees” and can unionize and those who are not and cannot. For example,
the interests of Division I college football players and Division I college men’s lacrosse players
are likely to be quite divergent on many issues.
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2002–03, 68 percent of Division I-A universities reported a profit
from their football programs, averaging $9.2 million, and 70 percent
reported a profit from their men’s basketball programs, averaging $3
105
million. Despite the strong financial performances in these sports,
Division I-A universities report an average financial loss of
$600,000.106 Without the redistribution of profits earned by football
and men’s basketball, virtually all universities would face increased
financial difficulty in maintaining athletic programs in other sports.
Given this reality, consider the previous example involving the
Duke University men’s basketball team. Assume that the NLRB
certifies Duke’s men’s basketball players as a valid collective
bargaining unit, and the NCAA changes its rules to allow all
institutions to grant aid up to the full cost of attendance. The Duke
men’s basketball union starts by demanding that the grant-in-aid from
Duke cover the full cost of attendance. Duke subsequently increases
the value of the scholarships it grants to men’s basketball players. But
the men’s basketball players remain unsatisfied. In recognition that
their efforts contribute more revenues to Duke athletic programs
107
than any other Duke sport and that their head coach garners
108
enormous compensation because of their collective success, the
men’s basketball players threaten to strike unless a set percentage of
the revenues they generate are distributed to them in various forms,
including salary and pension. Assuming the NCAA does not modify
its rules to make such concessions permissible, Duke is faced with the
dilemma of either breaking NCAA rules or watching its men’s
basketball team go on strike. If Duke pays its men’s basketball

105. NCAA REVENUE REPORT, supra note 15, at 14. The remaining Division I-A
universities reported average losses of $1.1 million and $400,000 in football and basketball,
respectively. Id.
106. Id. at 23. This figure is determined by subtracting expenses and “institutional support”
from revenues. “Institutional support” refers to amounts invested from general university funds
into athletic programs. The purpose of subtracting this amount is to determine the standalone
net impact of athletic programs without any outside assistance. See id. at 13 (“[Including
institutional support] may be misleading when attempting to determine the extent to which
athletics programs contribute to or detract from institutions’ coffers.”).
107. Duke University, Equity in Athletics 2007: Screening Questions 1, 11 (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (stating that Duke’s men’s basketball program earns $13,410,114, more than
any other Duke sports program). This information is also available at Equity in Athletics, U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., Office of Postsecondary Educ., http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/search.asp (search
“Name of Institution” for “Duke University”).
108. IRS Form 990, Duke Univ., Return of Org. Exempt from Income Tax (May 11, 2006),
available at http://tfcny.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/560/560532129/560532129_200506_990.
pdf (showing Mike Krzyzewski, men’s basketball coach, earns an annual salary of $1.2 million).
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players, not only does it likely have to balance the increased expenses
incurred in men’s basketball by cutting expenses or entire sports
elsewhere, but it would also violate NCAA rules and face numerous
109
sanctions, including possible banishment from the NCAA. If Duke
stands firm against its players, it risks the viability of its men’s
basketball program and the negative publicity that labor strife would
bring.
If the NCAA modified its rules to allow universities the
autonomy to negotiate employment terms with their athletes, the
economics of college athletics would be so recalibrated as to make
only high revenue-generating sports financially independent. Men’s
basketball and football would essentially become professional
110
sports. Other sports, however, could face elimination. In this way,
unionization of college athletes could reduce university athletic
departments to a handful of teams—that is, men’s basketball,
football, and the lucky women’s programs salvaged for Title IX
compliance.111
C. The Proper Forum for Unionizing College Sports: Congress
Faced with the stark reality of what unionizing college athletes
would mean for the college sports landscape, would the NLRB ever
allow college athletes to be classified as “employees” under the
NLRA? The domino effect of such a decision would transform
college athletics into something different, but perhaps that is a
desirable result. If college athletics is truly a commercial endeavor,

109. The NCAA would be unlikely to allow one member to essentially pay its athletes while
other members abided by NCAA rules.
110. Because women’s basketball is a revenue sport at many universities, see supra note 96,
in some instances it may also become de facto professional, or at least remain financially
independent.
111. Perhaps Title IX’s presence provides another reason to leave to Congress the balancing
of factors involved in applying the NLRA to college sports. Title IX requires equal funding for
men’s and women’s sports. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) (“No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”). If all sports other than football, men’s basketball, and women’s basketball were
eliminated, then, for Title IX purposes, women’s basketball could offset men’s basketball.
Football would still dramatically upset the Title IX balance, which would require the retention
of other women’s sports in addition to basketball. Alternatively, proposals have been made to
exclude football and men’s basketball from Title IX’s reach. See Glenn George, Fifty/Fifty:
Ending Sex Segregation in School Sports, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1113–14 (2002) (describing
previously proposed amendments to Title IX that would exempt “revenue” sports such as
football and men’s basketball from the law’s requirements).
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then perhaps it should be treated as a business, and market forces
should determine the fate of individual sports.
The role of the NCAA in college athletics is simultaneously
regulatory and commercial. In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
112
University of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court grappled with the
NCAA’s dual role in the antitrust context. It held that despite the
NCAA’s educational goals and nonprofit status, it was subject to
antitrust scrutiny.113 The Court, however, realized that “horizontal
restraints on competition are essential if the product,” intercollegiate
114
football, is to be available at all. The Court also looked favorably
upon the notion that the NCAA deserves deference to regulate
college athletics because it “plays a critical role in the maintenance of
a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.”115 In his dissent,
Justice White seized upon the idea of the NCAA’s role as steward of
college athletics to argue that the NCAA should be able to engage in
horizontal restraints with respect to football television contracts, just
as it is able to engage in restraints with respect to scholarships and
eligibility, among myriad other areas, through its vast set of rules.116
The proper roles of the NCAA and the NLRA are dictated by
policy choices regarding the nature of college sports. If the

112. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
113. See id. at 100–01 (stating that the decision to scrutinize horizontal price fixing by the
NCAA “is not based . . . on the fact that the NCAA is organized as a nonprofit entity, or on our
respect for the NCAA’s historic role in the preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate
amateur athletics”).
114. Id. at 101.
115. Id. at 120.
116. See id. at 122–23 (White, J., dissenting) (“In pursuing th[e] goal [of integrating amateur
athletics into the college educational system], the [NCAA] and its members seek to provide a
public good—a viable system of amateur athletics—that most likely could not be provided in a
perfectly competitive market. . . . [The NCAA] has prohibited athletes who formerly have been
compensated for playing from participating in intercollegiate competition, restricted the number
of athletic scholarships its members may award, and established minimum academic standards
for recipients of those scholarships; and it has pervasively regulated the recruitment process,
student eligibility, practice schedules, squad size, the number of games played, and many other
aspects of intercollegiate athletics. One clear effect of most, if not all, of these regulations is to
prevent institutions with competitively and economically successful programs from taking
advantage of their success by expanding their programs, improving the quality of the product
they offer, and increasing their sports revenues. Yet each of these regulations represents a
desirable and legitimate attempt to keep university athletics from becoming professionalized to
the extent that profit making objectives would overshadow educational objectives. . . . I do not
believe that the . . . television plan differs fundamentally for antitrust purposes from other
seemingly anticompetitive aspects of the organization’s broader program of self-regulation.”
(citations omitted)).
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maintenance of amateur college sports is desirable, the NCAA’s
regulatory function is of paramount importance. If college sports,
however, are an essentially commercial endeavor, then college sports
117
ought to fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRA. There are
numerous lines that can be drawn between these two outcomes.
Ultimately, Congress should draw those lines. Congress is in a
unique position to balance the commercial characteristics of college
sports against the qualities that distinguish college sports from
118
professional sports. Although the NLRB is capable of determining
the application of the NLRA to various industries, it has never before
made that determination for college athletics. In other industries,
unionization does not fundamentally alter the character of the
industry itself. By contrast, allowing college athletes to unionize
would change the very nature of college sports. Furthermore,
Congress did not contemplate “employee” rights for college athletes
when it first formulated the NLRA. Thus, Congress, not the Board,
ought to be the actor to decide whether to unionize college athletics.
Such action would both radically change the original understanding of
the NLRA and fundamentally alter the nature of college sports.

117. In the labor context, once college athletes are considered “employees,” then all NCAA
rules that affect athletes are subject to collective bargaining and can be changed. As discussed
by the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, NCAA
regulations are horizontal restraints and antitrust violations, and could successfully be
challenged. Id. at 101 (majority opinion). In other sports contexts, the interplay between
antitrust law and labor law has yielded the nonstatutory labor exemption to antitrust law. See,
e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235 (1996). Professional sports leagues have
taken advantage of the exemption, and, via collective bargaining agreements, sports leagues can
control overall salary levels and maintain competitive balance. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the NFL Management Council and the NFL Players Association, Article
XXIV (Mar. 8, 2006). Thus, one possible outcome of the ingress of labor law into college
athletics is that NCAA regulations could be saved from antitrust scrutiny by the nonstatutory
labor exemption. If, for instance, the athletes’ unions were weak, the NCAA could negotiate
collective bargaining agreements that incorporate by reference NCAA rules and their restrictive
regulations. Or, similarly, athletes’ unions may recognize that amateurism or the semblance
thereof is vital to the commercial success of college athletics, and thus agree to maintain
principles of amateurism to keep college sports viable. If either of these outcomes occur,
perhaps the NCAA would consider the cloud of unions in college athletics to have a silver
lining.
118. Congress regulates labor markets by exercising its constitutional power to regulate
commerce. Thus, although it has delegated much of its regulatory power over labor markets to
the NLRA, it can still restrict or withdraw the NLRA’s power in select industries. For example,
Congress has implemented industry-specific restrictions on the regulation of health care
institutions under the NLRA. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000)
(“Whenever the collective bargaining involves employees of a health care institution, the
provisions of this subsection shall be modified.”).
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CONCLUSION
The NCAA has never publicly espoused commercial success as
one of its goals. Nevertheless, it has overseen an era in which college
sports have increasingly become an economic force. At a time when,
because of the efforts of college athletes, large sums of money are
119
changing hands, and many coaches at top Division I schools receive
multimillion dollar compensation packages,120 athletes are bound to
demand a bigger piece of the college sports pie. Antitrust law is the
most common avenue pursued to gain the bigger piece, but labor law
is also a viable, though yet untrodden, path to the money. Indeed,
according to NLRB precedent and given the large revenues college
sports generate, college athletes in Division I football and men’s
basketball may be “employees” under the NLRA, capable of
unionization.
Although this route is perhaps legally viable, the foreseeable
consequences of unions of college athletes will completely alter
college sports and raise critical issues in the realms of antitrust law,
amateurism, and fairness. As the Supreme Court explained in Board
of Regents, the amateur status of the athletes who play college sports
is part of what makes college sports such an attractive product and
serves to distinguish them from other sports, such as minor league
baseball.121 Ultimately, different factors must be balanced, and the
public must decide what role it wants college sports to play in society.
Congress, which provided collective labor rights in the first place,
should be the venue through which this balance is struck.

119. CBS is paying the NCAA $6 billion to televise the NCAA Men’s Basketball
Tournament over a period of eleven years, News Release, NCAA, NCAA Reaches Rights
Agreement with CBS Sports (Nov. 18, 1999), and the Bowl Championship Series pays out over
$100 million per year in revenue to participating teams and their conferences, see BOWL
CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, 2007–2008 MEDIA GUIDE 9 (“The share to each conference . . . is
approximately $17 million.”).
120. For example, in January 2007, head coach Nick Saban left the NFL’s Miami Dolphins
to take a higher overall salary to become head football coach for the University of Alabama.
Saban’s reported $4 million salary would set a new standard for college coaches. Not only may a
college football player or two raise an eyebrow at the magnitude of Saban’s contract, but it may
draw congressional interest as well. David King, Coaches Mixed on Saban’s Deal, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 9, 2007, at 5D.
121. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02 (“The identification of this ‘product’ with an
academic tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than
professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor
league baseball.”).

